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Interspecies Equality

The Moral Standing of Animals
by Ivy Robertson
ir00344@georgiasouthern.edu
Noted animal rights activist, Tom Regan,
argues in his book The Case for Animal Rights
that all subjects of life “want and prefer
things, believe and feel things, recall and
expect things. And all these dimensions of our
life, including our pleasure and pain, our
enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and
frustration, our continued existence or our
untimely death—all make a difference to the
quality of our life as lived, as experienced by
us as individuals. As the same is true of …
animals … they too must be viewed as the
experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent
value of their own”(Regan, 24).
A common argument for the distinction
between human and animal life is derived
from differences in capacities that have been
proposed to raise humans above the “lower
species”. These qualities include developing
family ties, expressing emotions, and thinking
abstractly, but in truth, none of these are
uniquely human. Nor should they be a basis
for the moral consideration of only human
beings. The fact that we share a particular
physiology and genetic makeup is
unimportant and irrelevant from a moral
point of view. Each living being should be
respected and regarded as a subject, not an
object, despite differences that we use to
separate ourselves from the rest of the
animal kingdom.
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Attempts to categorize and rank the
interests and value of any life will not only
lead to speciesism, but if based on properties
such as rationality, autonomy, or the ability to
act morally, separate not only humans from
animals, but humans from other humans,
according to animal ethicist Peter Singer.
Even mankind differs in mental and
intellectual capacities. If we rely on these
properties to determine inherent value or
moral consideration, we are then able to
“justify a kind of discrimination against
certain human beings that is structurally
analogous to such practices as racism and
sexism”(Lori Gruen, The Moral Status of
Animals, 2017).
Singer, in All Animals are Equal, claims
that “the racist violates the principle of
equality by giving greater weight to the
interests of members of his own race, when
there is a clash between their interests and
the interests of those of another race.
Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of
his own species to override the greater
interests of members of other species. The
pattern is the same in each case”(Singer,
108). Singer proposes that we must extend
the “Principle of Equal Consideration of
Interests” first written about in Practical
Ethics to animals as well, a principle described
as “giving equal weight in our moral
deliberations to the like interests of all those
affected by our actions”(Singer, 21).
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